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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JULIA HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 9513

-vs.-

ELMO L. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STArrEMENT OF KIND OF. CASE
This is an actiori upon a petition and order to show
cause why the Defendant should not
punished for fail~
ure to pay support 1noney payments in the amount of
$4,605.00 and for judgment in that amount and attorneys'
fees. Defendant pleaded an affirmative defense to the
prayer for judgment alleging that the Plaintiff had told
the Defendant that if the Defendant would pay ce'rtain
creditors of Plaintiff and Defendant to prevent them
from garnisheeing her wages and so long as Defendant
satisfied said creditors and paid as much as he could
reasonably afford for support money for the children
that the Plaintiff would expect no more, and that had
Plaintiff not so agreed Defendant would have petitioned

be
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for a modification of the decree of divorce to reduce the
amount payable as support money, and that Plaintiff
should be estopped to seek a judgment against the Defendant fo;r $4,605.00, or for any amount. Defendant
cross-petitioned for a modification of the decree of divorce to reduce the support money payable for the support of the minor children of the parties from $50.00 per
month each to $35.00 per month each, alleging changed
circumstances, to wit: That at the time of the entry of
the decree of divorce, Plaintiff was unemployed, but
within two or three months thereafter she obtained steady
employment for which she has received in excess olf
$250.00 per month ever since.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court and the Court entered
a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff for $4,500.00 delinquent suppqrt money and $100.00 attorneys' fees. The
Court found the D·efendant guilty of contempt of court
and sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty days in the
county jail and denied Defendant's petition for modification of the decree of divorce. From such denial of Defendant's petition for modification of the decree of divorce and such judgment and' sentence of the Court, Defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and order
of the Court and every part thereof, and a new trial.
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In February, 1956, when the decree of· divorce was
entered, Defendant was out of work, was financially embarrassed, and was suffering from a double hernia (R.
24). Between that time and the first of January, 1959,
Defendant held four separate jobs for limited periods of
time, but in each case was unable beeause of his physical
condition to continue his work (R. 24-28}. During that
time he paid what he could to the Plaintiff for the support of the children (R. 26"'26). One of the jobs so held
by him was for a company known as· All' Plastics with
whom he'ohtained a position by purchasing 1,500 shares
of capital stock of the company with $1,500.00 which he
borrowed from his sister, Donna Petty, no ·part of which
he has been able to repay (R. 27-28). While out of work
he was obliged to depend upon -his sister with whom he
lived and who took care of him (R. 29). On January 1,
1959, Defendant was given a position with Sperry's after
having an operation for the repair of his hernias, and
he has worked continuously at Sperry's from that date
until now (R. 28). ThB court stated at the conclusion of
the evidence:
''The Defendant is in contempt since he has
been working at Sperry's .. " (R. 60)
-.Defendant's average inco:r_ne is now $68.00 per week,
$300.00 p~r month take home pay (R. 28). Defendant
has remarried and is living with his wife (R. 30).
Defendant's exp~nses a;re: $10.0D per month payable to sister on_ $2,000.00 of loans ( R. 29) ; $71.00 per
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month rent; $60.00 per month for groceries; $16.00 per
month for utilities; $5.00 per month for barber; $10.00
per month for clothes; $8.00 per month for laundry (R.
30). He uses his wife's car, a 1955 Buick, which was
purchased and paid for entirely by her. He maintains the
automobile at a cost of $35.00 to $40.00 per month. It is
necessary to his employment that he have access to an
automobile (R. 31). He has been unable to pay a cent
toward the purchase price of the automobile after paying
his living expenses, $60.00 per month to Plaintiff and
$10.00 per month to the children (R. 32).
The children are a boy, age fourteen, and a girl, age
ten and a half. Defendant called and talked with the girl
nearly every day until Plaintiff started' this action. Ever
since the divorce when in Salt Lake Defendant has visited
with the children every week or every two weeks (R. 32).
Plaintiff was not working at the time o£ the divorce
and had not worked at any time while they were married
(R. 33). Within forty-five to sixty days after the divorce
was granted, Plaintiff obtained employment (R. 33).
Plaintiff's present income is $325.00 per month, with
take home pay of $275.00 (R. 34). About six months after
the divorce her wages were garnisheed. Defendant testified that Plaintiff told hiln that if he would keep their
creditors "off her back" she would accept whatever he
could afford. She would get fired if they garnisheed her
wages (R. 36-37). She said she would be happy to accept
whatever he could afford so long as he kept the creditors
away from her place of business (R. 36). Defendant paid
several creditors to protect Plaintiff (R. 37).
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The Court sustained an objection to further testimony concerning bills paid by the Defendant to protect
the Plaintiff. The Court stated:
"I don't see that there would be any consideration for her trying to get hun to pay the bills.
Paragraph Si.x of the decree says he shall.'' (R.
38)
Since those conversations Defendant testified that
he has had happy relations with the Plaintiff until the
month of the hearing, and that he thought she was satisfied the way things were going; she had never indicated
that she woUld attempt to collect any unpaid support
money (R. 38).
Since he has worked at Sperry's he has not miss.ed
making a payment every month to the Plaintiff. During
the last year or year and a half he has been paying $60.00
per month (R. 38).
If Defendant's wages are garnisheed he will lose
his work. Two of his fellow employees have been dischargedfor garnishments (R. 39).
Defendant rmnarried in August, 1959. His present
wife -bought and paid for all furniture. She must contribute to maintenance of the home. .She has accumulated
no money since they were married (R. 40) .. Defendant
stated that he can pay $70.00 per month, the amount he
has been paying Plaintiff and giving to the children.
If Plaintiff had not told Defendant that she would
be satisfied if he paid their joint creditors and kept them
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satisfied and paid as much as he could possibly afford,
he would have secured an attorney and had the support
money reduced to what he could pay (R. 42).
Defendant paid not a dime on the Buick automobile
that his present wife bought (R. 44). The first month
he was at Sperry's he gave Plaintiff $40.00 and has never
missed payment since (R. 45). In 1957 he took bankruptcy and discharged all ohligations except those jointly
owed by him and Plaintiff, about $800.00 of obligations
(R. 46).
Defendant's present wife pays nothing on rent or
utilities but buys food from time to time. She earns
$220.00 per month take home pay (R. 46).
The son of the parties told Defendant that he makes
$40.00 per month from his paper route (R. 49).
Plaintiff testified that she has ne~er since the entry
of the decree of divorce, either orally or in writing, told
the Defendant he did not have to pay the full amount of
the money set forth in the decree, and that she has always
asked him for more. She is living at 2222 Preston Street
with the two children and her mother. Her sister is married and living in Sandy (R. 52). She does not think she
can support the children on less than $50.00 pe,r month
each (R. 52). Plaintiff is employed at Hercules Powder
Company earning $325.00 per month with $275.00 per
month take home pay (R. 53). She takes credit for the
two children as her dependents (R. 53).
She is buying her home and paying $91.00 per month
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therefor. Her nwther 's incmne is $102.00 per rnonth. The
mother pays $60.00 per month into the household (R. 53).
The house is in the narne of the mother, sister and Plaintiff (R. 54). The sister paid $100.00 per month for board
and room and on the house. She made $325.00 per month
(R.5-l:). The boy earns an average of $20.00 per month
from his paper route (R. 55). Plaintiff has had repairs
on the house; she has had appliances go out; the house
needs painting; both of the children need an orthodontist;
the boy has hay fever and ne·eds a series of shots which
are very expensive (R. 55).
Defendant has been carrying insurance on the children for medical expenses and they have had about
$800.00 of medical expenses paid by the insurance in the
last year or two (R. 55-56). Medical insurance does not
cover hay fever (R. 56). Plaintiff pays $9'1.00 per month
on the hon1e, $35.00 per week for food for herself, her
mother and the two children, leaving $200.00 per month
for other things (R. 56).
Plaintiff was asked what other things she needs that
require $200.00, (R. 56). Thereupon, the Court interjected:
"I don't care to hear it. 1 know what it takes.
I don't care what she takes othe,rwise * * * If you
want to confine it to ·what she needs for the kiddies, well and good, but what she needs for herself and her mother, I am not intere·sted in it.''
(R. 56).
Plaintiff was then asked to tell what she thinks she
requires besides food and the rent. She answered, "Since
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my sister left I have to have a car.'' (R. 56). The Court
then interjected:
''I am not interested in what this lady has to
have. She can he rich as Croesus. She is getting
no alimony. I am only talking about the Defendant's duty to support his kiddies, what she needs
for the kids." (R. 57).
Plaintiff testified that the boy had two front teeth
broken half off which need to be repaired at a cost of
about $100.00 each. The daughter needs to go to an
orthodontist for work to cost over $200.00 (R. 57).
Plaintiff has taken no action of any kind against
Defendant to collect anything more than the amounts he
has been paying until within the last thirty days prior to
trial. She stated that she has asked him every time she
has seen him that she needs more money, but she has
done nothing about any action (R. 59). Defendant testified that until the last thirty days Plaintiff has never
complained about him not paying her enough money
(R. 60).
Defendant offered the sister of the Defendant, Donna
Petty, as a witness to testify that Plaintiff had told her
that as long as the Defendant paid the bills and paid her
what he could that she would be satisfied. The Court
refused to permit the witness to testify and stated:
"That would be no consideration for that type
of promise." (R. 60)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
AHGUMENT
POINT ONE
rrhe trial court erred in entering judgment in favor
of Plaintiff and against the Defendant for $4,500.00. The
court misapplied the law applicable to the point at issue.
Plaintiff sought a judg1nent for accrued and unpaid
support money in the amount of $4,605.00. The court
awarded judgment for $4,500.00. Defendant pleaded as
a defense to the prayer for judgment that the Plaintiff
told hun shortly after the divorce was entered and after
she had been garnisheed by a judgment creditor that if he
would satisfy joint creditors and would pay her as much
as he could afford that she would expect no more. He
further pleaded that had the Plaintiff not done so he
would have petitioned for a n1odification of the decree of
divorce to reduce the amount ordered paid as support
money, and that Plaintiff should be estopped to seek a
judgment against him for $4,605.00, or for any amount.
The Defendant testified in support of this allegation
(R. 36-37). The Plaintiff denied that she had made such
an agreement (R. 52).
The trial court obviously 1nisapplied the law applicable to the point at issue. At one point Plaintiff objected to further testimony concerning the bills paid by
the Defendant to protect the Plaintiff from garnisheeing
creditors. The trial court sustained the objection, stating
"I don't see that there would be any consideration for her trying to get him to pay the bills.
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Paragraph Six of the decree says he shall." (R.
38).
Again Defendant offered the siste,r of the Defendant
Donna Petty, as a witness to testify that the Plaintiff had
told her that as long as the Defendant paid the hills and
paid what he could that she would be satisfied. The Court
refus·ed to permit her to testify and stated:
"That would he no consideration for that type
of promise." (R. 60).
It is Defendant's position that in such a matter the
defense need not be founded upon consideration but is
properly based upon estoppel.
In the case of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300
P. 2d 596, the Court stated:
"A mother by her actions or representations
or both may preclude herself from recovering
pastdue installments of support money to reim·
burse her for the money which she has spent for
the support of the children where the father's
failure to make such payments was induced by her
representation or action and where as a result of
representations or actions the father has been
lulled into changing his position which he would
not have done but for such representations, and
that as a result of such failure to pay and change
in his condition it would cause him great hardship
and injustice if she is allowed to enforce the pay.
ment of such back installments, she may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment for such
back installments."

The Defendant not only testified that the Plaintiff
agreed to be satisfied with what he could pay in addition
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to paying off joint obligations of the parties, but he also
testified that until this proceeding was filed that she
made no complaint of his inability to pay the full amount
of $100.00 per rnonth and appeared to be satisfied with
the payments he was making (R. 38). It is true that she
testified that she complained eve·ry time she saw him that
he was not paying enough (R. 59). He testified and
she did not deny that until she filed her action he talked
with the daughter practically every day on the telephone
and visited the children of the parties once a week or at
least every two weeks. The Defendant has been employed
steadily since January, 1959, and she has not taken any
action to obtain more than he has been paying or to obtain
the full amount of the payn1ents that have accrued until
this proceeding was filed.
·
The Defendant cannot contend that the judgment of
the court is not based upon competent evidence, but the
great weight of the evidence is contrary to the statement
of the Plaintiff that she did not agree to be satisfied so
long as the Defendant paid joint creditors and paid as
much as he could reasonably afford. Moreover, it is apparent that the Court misapplied the law applicable to
this defense.
POINT TWO
The trial court erred in refusing to permit the sister
of the Defendant, Donna Petty, to testify that the Plaintiff had told her that so long as the Defendant paid joint
obligations and paid what he could for the support of the
children that she would be satisfied. The court mis-
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POINT THREE
The Court erred in finding the Defendant guilty of
contempt.
The Court stated that the Defendant was guilty of
contempt for failure to pay the full amount of the suppo~rt
money during the time that he has been employed at
Sperry's (R. 60). Thus, his actions prior to that time
need not he discussed.
The testimony is that while he is at Sperry's he has
earned from $50.00 per week take home pay to $68.00 per
week take home pay (R. 28). During the period that
he has been so employed he has never mis.sed a payment
even though his payments have not been the full amQUJlt
ordered paid (R. 38). The evidence shows that at the
present time his expenses are: $10.00 per month payable
to his sister on $2,000.00 of loans (R. 29); $71.00 per
month rent; $60.00 pe;r month for groceries; $16.00 per
month for utilities; $5.00 per month for barber; $10.00
per month for clothes; $8.00 per month for laundry (R.
30). He is obliged to maintain an automobile which was
purchased and paid for entirely by his Wife, at a cost to
him of $35.00 to $40.00 per month (R. 31). He testified
that after paying such expenses and $60.00 per month to
the Plaintiff and $10.00 per month to the children (R.
32) that he has nothing left with which to pay more.
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1_1lw foregoing payinents total $285.00 of his $300.00
take home pay. It is apparent that the foregoing items of
expense cannot cover all of his expenses as everyone has
a multitude of expenses not embraced within the foregoing category of expenses.
In addition to Defendant paying Plaintiff $60.00 per
month and giving the children $10.00 per month, the
Plaintiff has received the benefit of taking the children
as her dependents (R. 53). This give.s her an additional
$20.00 or $21.00 per month benefit as her income tax is
reduced by that amount. Thus, the $70.00 paid by De·fendant and the $20.00 which she has received the benefit
of amounts to $90.00 pe~r month. In addition, without any
order of Court so to do, the Defendant has. maintained
medical insurance upon the children and there has been
paid by the insurer for the benefit of the children within
the last year or two $800.00 for medical expenses (R. 5556), thus relieving the Plaintiff of these medical costs,
which greatly exceed the remaining difference1 between
$90.00 per month and $100.00 perr month, or even a difference of $30.00 a month during the last two years, which
is the full mnount of the difference between the $70.00
per month which has been paid by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff and the children and the $100.00 ordered paid.
It thus appears that she has received the benefit of at
least $100.00 per month during the past two years while
he has been working for Sperry's.
Considering the further fact that he has been in daily
communication ·with the daughter of the parties and has
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seen the two children of the parties at least every two
weeks and usually every week during the past years, it
seems inconceivable that the Court would find the Defendant in contempt of court under such circumstances
and commit the Defendant to jail for thirty days therefor. It is so contrary to the usual treatment accorded
defendants in such a proceeding as the case at bar.
Furthermore, the Defendant will, no doubt, lose his
work if he. is required to spend thirty days in jail.
POINT FOUR
The trial court abused its discretion in committing
the Defendant to jail for thirty days. The argument
under Point Three is applicable to this point.
POINT FIVE
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's
petition for modification of the decree of divorce to reduce the amount of support money payable by the· Defendant to the Plaintiff. The trial court misapplied the
law applicable to the point at issue. ·
The evidence concerning the Defendant's ability to
pay has been set forth under Points One and Three,
supra. In addition, the evidence shows that from tlie. time
of the entry of the decree of divorce in February, 1956,
to January, 1959, the Defendant was unable to maintain
employment because of his physical condition. During
that period of time his income was small when he· did work
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and during a large part of the ti1ne he was obliged to
depend upon his sister to n1aintain him (R. 29). At the
time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce Plaintiff was
not employed and had not been since she was married to
Defendant. Within two months thereafter, she obtained
work and ever since has received from $250.00 to $325.00
per month (R. 28). This constitutes a material change
of circumstances.
Here again the Court 1nisapplied the law applicablP.
to the point at issue.
The testimony showed that the Plaintiff is paying
$91.00 per month on the home in which she lives and
$35.00 per week for food for herself, her mother and her
children, and that her income totals $425.00 per month,
including her take home pay of $275.00, the boy's earnings
of at least $20.00 per month as she testified, the mother's
contribution of $60.00 per month, and the moneys which
have been furnished by the Defendant totalling $70.00 per
month, leaving a balance after payment on the hmne and
for food of $190.00 per month.
The Plaintiff was asked what other things she needed
that would require $200.00 per month. Without objection
of counsel the Court interjected:
''I don't care to hear it. I know what it takes.
I don't care what she takes otherwise * * * If you
want to confine it to what she needs for the kiddies, well and good, but what she needs for herself
and her mother, I am not interested in it." (R. 56)
Plaintiff was then asked to tell what she thinks she
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requires besides food and rent. She answered, "Since my
sister left I have to have a car." (R. 56). The Court
again without objection of Plaintiff's couns.el interjected:
"I am not interested in what this lady has to
have. She can be rich as Croesus. She is getting
no alimony. I am only talking about the Defendant's duty to support the kiddies, what she needs
for the kids." (R. 57)
It appears that her income has been wholly adequate
for the support of the children and herself a~ she made
no testimony otherwise. Apparently she was satisfied
until ''Since my sister left I have to have a car.''
It is the. position of the Defendant that the mother
owes an obligation to the children and that if the father's
financial condition is such that he cannot live reasonably
and pay the full amount necessary to support the children, the mqther, being able, should assist in the support
of the children.
The statmnent contained in Wallace v. Wallace, 9
Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103, is to the point:·
"The fact that the marriage is · terminated
does not obliterate whatever results it may have
produced. They cannot be wished away nor ignored. Both spouses continue to sustain some duties toward each other and to the children. It is
important to remember that these duties do not
all run ·one way; they are re·ciprocal and must be
faced up to if the proper objective is to be served.
The purpose of the divorce decree and of the conduct of the parties under it must he calculated toward the solution of existing problems and sus-
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tenance of the parties so they can reconstruct their
lives on the most wholesome foundation possible
under the circtunstances. The purpose of the provision for alirnony and support money is to provide for the current needs and not to allow the
beneficiary to sit by and permit a burdensome
debt to accumulate and then use it to harness the
Defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live arespectable existence. Even though the decree may
impose the responsibility of support upon the
husband primarily, the wife also has a duty to see
that the children are furnished with the necessities of life. It is because of the recognition of the
continuing obligations of the parties for the welfare of the children that the statute provides that
they are subject to such further orders of the court
with respect thereto as the court shall deem reasonably proper. Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953."
The Legislature of Utah apparently is in accord with
this statement made in Wallace v. Wallace. Section 303-3 provides :
''30-3-3. Ternporary Alirnony and Suit :Money
The eourt may order either party to pay to the
clerk a sum of money for the separate support
and maintenance of the adverse party and the
ehildren and to enable such party to defend the
action.''
In 19 C.J. Section 817, Page 356, the following statement of the law is made:
"The reasonableness of the amount· allowed
for the support .of the children depends largely
upon the needs of the children and the financial
eondition of the father, including his earning cap-
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acity. If a Inother to whmn custody of a child has
been awarded has means of he:r own, she may be
held to contribute toward its support and thus
diminish the amount to be paid by the father, the
rule in this respect not differing materially from
that applied in the case of an allowance of permanent alimony. In such cases the court should,
therefore, consider the ability of the parents, the
care and attention the mother must give the children, the assistance the mother will receive from
the children, if any, and all the surrounding facts
and circumstances and equalize the burden between them as nearly as may be."
Defendant submits that the Judgment and Order of
the Trial ·Court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
:MoFFAT, IVERSON AND ELGGREN

By J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorneys for Defendant
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